EVERYBODY APART FROM GOJIRA (AND MAYBE TURKEY) SHOULD PROBABLY JUST READ THE RECAP AT THE BOTTOM.

Definitions:

1) X is any arbitrary event. (I was born in Germany.)

2) ¬X denotes "not X". (I was not born in Germany.)

3) E represents the existence of positive evidence that indicate X is correct. (My birth certificate is from Germany.)

4) ¬E denotes "not E", or the total absence of positive evidence.

5) P(X) denotes the probability of X.

6) P(X/E) denotes the conditional probability of X given E; this is the joint probability of X and E divided by the probability of E.

P(X/E) =  P(X^E) / P(E)

Assumption (1):
- If an event like X were to really have happened, then it very likely left some evidence of itself. In other words, the probability of E, given X, is greater than the probability of NOT E, given X.

P(E/X) > P(¬E/X)

1 - P(¬E/X) > P(¬E/X)

P(¬E/X) < 1/2

This isn't an unfair assumption, as most things of significance leave some sort of evidence.

Now we invoke Bayes' Theorem: P(¬E/X) = P(X/¬E)P(¬E) / P(X).

->  1/2 > P(X/¬E)P(¬E) / P(X)

P(X/¬E) < (1/2) P(X)/P(¬E)

Thinking about P(X) in the equation immediately prior, is X a likely or unlikely event?

Assumption 2:
- The event X is extraordinary. P(X) << 1. The probability of event X is very small.

Let X be an intersection of two statistically independent events, A and B. X = A^B. (I was born in Germany, and I love shitting on my neighbour's lawn.) However, the joint probability of A and B is always equal to or less than the probability of A or B. P(AB) = P(A)P(B). The more events which define X, the lower the probability.

Returning to the emboldened equation, consider the term P(¬E). What can we say about the likelihood of evidence for X?

Assumption 3:
- We have searched for evidence of X, but failed to find any. P(¬E) [approx.]= 1. The probability of no actual evidence for X is very high, and the more we search for E but fail, the closer this value approaches 1.

Bringing forward the emboldened equation again:

P(X/¬E) < (1/2) P(X)/P(¬E)

The more specific and extraordinary X, the closer P(X) is to 0. And the more we search for evidence, but fail, the closer ¬E is to 1. The ratio here [P(X)/P(¬E)] then, must be very small. As long as this ratio is less than one, the entire right-hand side of the inequality is less than one-half.

P(X/¬E) < 1/2. This inequality must hold. This implies: P(¬X/¬E) > 1/2.

We finally arrive at:

P(¬X/¬E) > P(X/¬E). In other words, given an absence of any evidence for X, the more likely event is that X did not, in fact, occur.

This is a demonstration of the epistemic principle known as the inference to the best explanation. Many things cannot be known with absolute certainty, but we can show which explanations are most preferable.

Recap:
1) An event like X should leave evidence.
2) All things being equal, X is unlikely.
3) We have searched for evidence of X, but failed.

From these premises, it mathematically follows that ¬X is a more likely event than X.

Let X be the following claim:

The Virgin Mary, upon being impregnated by Yahweh, gave birth to a half-blooded demigod named Jesus of Nazareth. During his life, Jesus performed many miracles that included healing the sick, raising the dead and turning water into wine. Jesus also took the aggregate sins of humanity upon himself, and gave his own life for us. Upon his execution by Roman authorities, Jesus rose from the dead and ascended to Heaven. All of these events were compiled into the record, with inerrancy, known as the New Testament.

And anybody who fails to believe this will spend an eternity in endless suffering.

If any of this is to be the case, we should find evidence beyond mere say-so.

P(E/X) > P(¬E/X).

X is a huge intersection of independent events, all competing with the various denominations and interpretations of Christian doctrine which is, in turn, competing with those belonging to other religions. Significant positive evidence for Christianity is yet to have been found, also.

P(X) [appox.]= 0.

P(¬E) [approx.]= 1.

P(¬X/¬E) [approx.]= 1. Quad erat demonstrandum.

It is. Because if they kill in the name of Quakerism, Quakerism drove them to do it. Otherwise, they wouldn't have done it.

It's quite obvious that people can be wrong about the propositions that motivate them. Back to my theft analogy; if a Muslim claims Islam motivated him to steal bacon, there is quite a clear divide between the religious propositions he claims to follow and his actions.

He's either being dishonest or--in the case of both Quakers and antinatalists--he doesn't actually understand the content of the propositions which he claims motivated him.

or a godless Christian.

Well, y'know, I hate to be that guy.

If it encourages people to not procreate, people will always take this to the "next level" and do whatever is necessary in their minds to fulfill that goal.

I'll refer you to my prior analogy then:

If Alvin Plantinga got droves and droves of militant Christians to enforce Reformed Epistemology in schools and hang people who disagreed, that doesn't make Reformed Epistemology militant within itself. There is no propositional content within Reformed Epistemology which actually advocates or supports the use of violence. The fact that some people choose to enforce a philosophy or an ideology in such a way, isn't necessarily a comment on the nature of that philosophy or ideology.

Why? To enforce babies not being born.

Except that would, on balance, worsen the problem which leads antinatalists to say its immoral to have children. Ergo, they wouldn't be genuine antinatalists (even if they felt genuinely motivated by it).

You can't be an antinatalist (at least in the Schopenhauerian tradition) and then try to enforce your philosophy in ways which obviously increase the net amount of suffering.

To me? That's vague enough for people to enforce this by any means necessary.

All that shows is a deficit in your understanding of antinatalism.

Funnily enough: https://yourlogicalfallacyis.com/strawman

I'm talking about the "tenets" of anti natalism.

. . . That's exaclty our point. The tenets of antinatalism are not necessarily violent, and the fact that some people would behave in such a way and claim the motivation of antinatalism I) isn't a comment on antinatalism at all and II) doesn't make their motivation from antinatalism legitimate.

You have to show explicitly violent content within antinatalism.

But the majority of the followers are peaceful.

Irrelevant, Islamic propositions are clearly violent.

If the suicide bomber killed others in the name of Jainism, I very well could.

So if a Muslim ran out of a liquor store with a bottle of Jack and a packet of bacon shouting "Allahu Ackbar", you could claim Islam encourages the theft of liquor and bacon?

Islam is a religion of peace.

Yes, but that's false because the propositions within Islam aren't peaceful. Jainism is a peaceful religion, and if you found a Jain who was also a suicide bomber, you wouldn't be able to claim Jainism was no longer peaceful.

It wouldn't be voluntary because there's no way the entire human race would agree to it.

Except I've already demonstrated how this is irrelevant, and that you're making the assumption that this is in any way relevant to Verbatim's philosophy. . .

It wouldn't be voluntary. I don't care for hypotheticals. Fact of the matter is, people would resist, and forcing them to not procreate with the end goal being the destruction of humanity (sugarcoat it as much as you like and use terms like "anti natalism"), it's genocide.

Except it's not, because that's not what Verbatim advocates.

We don't need to claim that voluntary extinction is possible to show how it isn't genocidal. There's nothing about antinatalism would necessitates coercion, and there's nothing contradictory about the concept of voluntary extinction.

That sounds like an assumption.

No, it's literally what you said.

I said is voluntary extinction genocide, and you tried to claim it doesn't matter because the only way Verbatim would ever get his way is through some sort of genocidal infringement upon other people. Which doesn't follow.

This is how he argues.

This really isn't a problem with Challenger. It's a problem with how people can become morally dumbfounded. In the same way people can become logically dumbfounded and fail to accept the correct answer to the Monty Hall problem.

Which is why philosophy education ought to be mandatory.

I don't feel like arguing BS hypotheticals.

It's not a BS hypothetical, though. It's about whether or not you can actually accuse Verbatim of advocating genocide. Which you obviously can't because voluntary extinction isn't genocide.

Seriously, it wouldn't be voluntary. I don't really care to argue for hypothetical BS.

You're just avoiding the question. We're talking about a relation of ideas, here, not some synthetic proposition. If I were to say "voluntary extinction will happen", that's a synthetic proposition.

But I'm not. There's nothing contradictory contained within the idea of voluntary extinction, at all. Nobody's assuming that it will or probabalistically can happen, we're merely noting how it's coherent.

The question is a valid one; is voluntary extinction genocide?