Which is defined by human well-being.

Not really. If you're not suffering, then my job is done, I'd argue. Now, just because you're not suffering, doesn't necessarily mean that you're "well"--while the absence of pain is good, the absence of pleasure isn't bad.

From an ethical standpoint, if all suffering is removed in the universe, I don't care if the universe is happy or not. Assuming that's part of the "wellbeing" package.

EDIT: I'd also argue that gratuitous, or dysteleological suffering, is the issue. Some suffering might actually contribute to human well-being in the long-run.

given that we basically live in a dysteleological universe, i'm gonna need a few examples

given that we basically live in a dysteleological universe, i'm gonna need a few examples

Well, that's the thing really. Given your Schopenhauerean perspective, and my Nietzschean perspective, I doubt we'll be able to come to any agreement.

I can't really give you any solid empirical examples, but let's assume for instance that the nuclear disaster in Japan will lead to more efficient nuclear regulations, preventing a greater loss of lives in the future.

Assume that:

1. Pleasure can be measured on a linear scale, i.e. in units
2. The greater the units of pleasure, the more ethical the action

So there's you, a stranger, and a slice of cake. You can either choose to give the cake to the stranger or eat yourself. (You can't split it.) You will get 100 units of pleasure from eating the cake; the stranger will get 75.

Now on this basis alone (not accounting for other variables such as how the person will feel if you deny the cake to them etc) the answer clearly looks to be that eating the cake yourself is the most ethical option -- as long as you make the decision for that reason. I really don't see how it could be any other way.

I don't accept your second premise there. Frankly, I don't care about pleasure--there is no ethical imperative to pleasure people; there is only an ethical imperative to eliminate suffering. Because while the presence of pleasure is good, the absence of pleasure isn't bad.

Either way, the bit in parentheses there really bothers me. The bit where you say that you wouldn't be accounting for any other variables, like how they'd feel if you offered it, or how they'd feel if you didn't offer it.

...You must include these variables. Otherwise, it just looks like you're setting up the experiment in such a way that would conveniently help your argument.

If you're aiming for an empirically verifiable system of ethics, then presupposing that you have to exclude yourself directly conflicts with that aim:

1. Ethical propositions are reducible to facts about experience.
2. If certain experiences are good, and other experiences are bad, it follows logically that it is better to increase the good than increase the bad, and better to minimize the bad than minimize the good
3. It is only ethical to increase the good in others; to increase your own good has no place in ethics.

#3 is the only one that can't be empirically verified. Rather it's an arbitrary ruling suited to a categorical conception of ethics.

For whatever reason, I decided to tackle each of these paragraphs from the bottom up, rather than top-to-bottom. So, I already covered this, on the paragraph beginning with "because you are not worth..."

Well, that's where I think you've got a problem, because if all acts are inherently selfish, there's no clear distinction to make between altruistic/ethical and selfish/unethical.

Some things are only selfish because you gain personal gratification from them. Donating money might make you feel good inside, for example. This is selfish--it's good that we have these psychological mechanisms that give us the incentive to do good deeds, but the fact that we need incentives to do good deeds in the first place is flawed psychology. We shouldn't need incentives to do good deeds--we should just do that which is intrinsically good.

I'm not just saying "everything we do is selfish"--I'm saying that everything we do is selfish to a certain degree. Even my veganism, to a certain extent, is selfish--I achieve personal gratification from being up on this ethical high ground, and I like to make people feel bad about their addictive meat-eating personalities. That's not a good thing, but it makes me feel good to grandstand. I like knowing that I'm doing a better job at being ethical than another guy. I probably shouldn't be like that.

However, it's possible for the selfishness to be outweighed, so as to make the selfishness nearly invisible. Even though it's selfish to do good deeds because they make you feel good, you're still doing good deeds, and that's what matters.

Why do consequences that affect others matter more than the consequences that affect yourself?

Because you are not worth others' welfare. Now, if you instead worded the question like, "do consequences that affect an other matter more than the consequences that affect you?" that would've worked better to illustrate your point.

If we're dealing with only one other person, then neither one matters more than the other, assuming they're both Joe Sixpack. Whether one has his leg broken, or the other has his leg broken, there's no distinction. These are not the types of scenarios that I'm referring to, however.

Two Joe Sixpacks are more valuable than one Joe Sixpack.

it's entirely contingent on circumstance

Clearly, I'm referring only to scenarios where giving someone $101 instead of $100 would actually make a difference. The numbers are arbitrary.

Compare the emotive responses you'll receive when giving someone a dollar, and giving someone a thousand dollars. It's academic.

That's assuming that $100 was your absolute limit and anything over would make sustaining yourself difficult. Which isn't what I meant.

I'm not assuming anything about any sum of money. $100 is, again, arbitrary.

However much money you think you need to get yourself by is the amount you would keep, quite obviously. That's the point.

Daily reminder that morality is subjective and if you don't think so you might as well just remove yourself from the gene pool you waste of space

Daily reminder that morality is subjective

Ha.

No. The fact that a certain presupposition of values must take place before moral reasoning can occur is a non-issue, literally. Physics--as much all of the sciences--also makes presuppositions, yet nobody questions them because they are epistemologically useful to make. Such must be the case with morality, and sentient well-being/suffering.