When it comes to the study of meta-ethics, I consider myself a cognitivist, specifically a moral realist--even more specifically, an ethical naturalist.

Essentially, it's true that moral sentences express propositions which relate to objective features of the world and are thus cognitively meaningful. Morality, also, must necessarily relate to human flourishing--or eudaimonia--if it is to make any sense.

Taking this into consideration, the most solid moral fact we can therefore identify is: "It would be wrong to create a situation which would facilitate the worst possible suffering for everybody".

What if there was such a situation that, given terrible suffering for everyone, would lead to an eventual pay-off? Is it morally sound because it eventually ends with something good for humanity if it entails large amounts of suffering?

What if the difference in morality lies in the method, not the outcome? Is it morally correct to divert a train into a man working on the tracks if it means saving the lives of a couple of hikers, or is it more correct to not interfere? Or is it better to let someone live in a vegetative state, who feels no sensation be it pain or pleasure, or to pull the plug?

What if there was such a situation that, given terrible suffering for everyone, would lead to an eventual pay-off? Is it morally sound because it eventually ends with something good for humanity if it entails large amounts of suffering?

It could be possible to descend first in order to ascend later; one real-world example of this would be the IMF's requirement of countries to economically restructure, before getting any assistance.

What if the difference in morality lies in the method, not the outcome? Is it morally correct to divert a train into a man working on the tracks if it means saving the lives of a couple of hikers, or is it more correct to not interfere? Or is it better to let someone live in a vegetative state, who feels no sensation be it pain or pleasure, or to pull the plug?

All morality is consequential--this is just necessary. Some moral questions don't, currently, have solid answers to us yet. Any real-life application of the train/trolley problem would have so many variables to consider. In essence, you can't reduce morality to a snapshot of mathematical considerations.

For example, in such a situation of strict utilitarianism, it'd be better for a mother to save ten other children over her own son. However, when thought about properly, it is consequentially beneficial that we have these parent-child relationships when considering society at large. If a consequence of taking a purely mathematical view is this break-down in relationships involving trust, then it isn't positively consequential.

Like, if I answer that I'd push the fat man in front of the train (in a modified scenario of the one you mention), people seem to think it's inconsistent for me to not advocate the murder of patients by doctors for the sake of harvesting their organs and saving more people. The trust relationship based on not being pushed off a bridge in front of a train is nowhere near as significant as the one based on being cared for--instead of murdered--by a doctor.

Most people, when considering human well-being in the paradigm of some utilitarian philosophy, think very narrowly of what the term "consequence" means.

I'm glad you responded that way, it's exactly what I expected. Morality is, in nearly every application, too complex of a thing to choose a single correct response. You can be objective to a degree, but it can't work on an encompassing scale such as law. It's just too general to say, "x is objectively the moral thing to do" outside of (as you put it) snapshots of mathematical considerations.

So basically, my response is that morality is objective only on a large scale.

What if there was such a situation that, given terrible suffering for everyone, would lead to an eventual pay-off? Is it morally sound because it eventually ends with something good for humanity if it entails large amounts of suffering?

What if the difference in morality lies in the method, not the outcome? Is it morally correct to divert a train into a man working on the tracks if it means saving the lives of a couple of hikers, or is it more correct to not interfere? Or is it better to let someone live in a vegetative state, who feels no sensation be it pain or pleasure, or to pull the plug?

In order to "pay off" any suffering incurred, the "good" that would come as a result would have to outweigh that suffering. Otherwise, you have yourself a zero-sum game. What you just described is more or less an argument for an objective "morality" (using that word makes me want to puke), more or less, which I know you don't believe in, so I'm kind of confused as to where you're going with that.

Edit:

So, okay, so you DO believe in an objective morality... on a large scale. Well, I would just argue that there really is no other scale. It's a large scale--but it's also the only scale.

So, okay, so you DO believe in an objective morality... on a large scale. Well, I would just argue that there really is no other scale. It's a large scale--but it's also the only scale.

I'd use Physics and Quantum Physics as an example. The subjects run on two different rule books, physics for large scale and quantum physics for (duh) small scale. This is because (in the absolutely simplest explanation I can think of) in physics, the smaller you get, the less accurate the results are. To solve that, a different set are used for physics equations on the quantum level.

Same principle here: on a large scale, you can say the morality is objective. But the more specific you get, the less accurate you become. Since morality doesn't involve formulas to give objective results in the first place, however, it can simply be reasoned that objective morality cannot work on a small scale and is thus subjective.

but there's a difference between subjectivity in that sense

The problem a lot of people run into is thinking that because somebody quite emotively thinks something is moral (like, stoning women to death for adultery) then nobody is in fact correct--it's just a matter of emotion. And, of course, emotions factor into it--that's a consequence.

You can, however, say you can talk objectively about the ontologically subjective. Otherwise, fields of study like psychology or neuroscience wouldn't exist. The facts about consequence could differ from person to person, and thus there are very few absolutely moral RULES. There are, however, still facts.

And that is where moral objectivity breaks down; as I said, objective morality cannot exist on a small scale.

This is the confusion I'm talking about.

Don't confuse a shortcoming in human perception with a lack of facts. If moral facts exist, they necessarily exist at all scales of consideration.

Quote from: Meta Cognition on January 06, 2015, 05:25:17 PM

Quote from: Prime Meridia on January 06, 2015, 05:21:59 PM

And that is where moral objectivity breaks down; as I said, objective morality cannot exist on a small scale.

This is the confusion I'm talking about.

Don't confuse a shortcoming in human perception with a lack of facts. If moral facts exist, they necessarily exist at all scales of consideration.

I think this is a problem of communication. In my previous example, involving genocide, even on the more specific scale the objective view still applies, but only broadly. You can give a general response that is objective, absolutely, but the more specific a subject gets the more subjective it becomes as well.

I think I see what you're saying.

You're not necessarily negating the existence of facts at the moral "quantum" level; you're saying that as we get more and more specific and into more convoluted situation, it's more difficult to grasp the answer and thus moral discourse will be more susceptible to subjective influences?

In America, cannibalism is morally wrong

In parts of India and various indigenous tribes around the world, cannibalism is seen as acceptable

Quote from: Prime Meridia on January 06, 2015, 05:21:59 PM

"Genocide of the chronically handicapped is morally right" is much more subjective because it boils down to your individual approach of the subject in terms of your socioeconomic views. And that is where moral objectivity breaks down; as I said, objective morality cannot exist on a small scale.

From my perspective, if you can't demonstrate why genocide of the chronically handicapped is morally right--if you fail to demonstrate why, then you're just wrong, flat-out. If you can demonstrate it, well, now you have yourself an objective argument. Just because something is controversial or difficult to argue doesn't make it subjective.

Edit:
Basically what Meta said. He's a lot faster than me, so I'll just let him take care for me...

Meta hit it on the nail, actually. It's not that it's "wrong" on a quantum level, it's that the answer becomes more of a gray area the more specific the subject becomes. For the genocide argument-- the fact is that you can demonstrate and support for or against it well all based on your view of it. And because there are such a number of different views that express support or opposition, it would be either incredibly difficult (or impossible) to reach a specific answer to it. It's possible to find a general application to the umbrella it falls under (genocide), but specific scenarios don't have a specific moral response.

Meta hit it on the nail, actually. It's not that it's "wrong" on a quantum level, it's that the answer becomes more of a gray area the more specific the subject becomes. For the genocide argument-- the fact is that you can demonstrate and support for or against it well all based on your view of it. And because there are such a number of different views that express support or opposition, it would be either incredibly difficult (or impossible) to reach a specific answer to it. It's possible to find a general application to the umbrella it falls under (genocide), but specific scenarios don't have a specific moral response.

That's reasonable. I guess for me, here's an analogy... morality is as subjective to me as the existence of god. Most people aren't gonna say that the question of "is there a god" is a matter of opinion--there either factually is or there factually isn't, but we can't ever really know that, so it's an unfalsifiable hypothesis--the same term could be used to describe any moral conundrums and dilemmas we could come up with. To your initial example, you say that the worker is more valuable than the few hikers--I might ask you, well, how good of a worker was he? Did he do his job well? Was he like, fifty-nine years old and about to retire? All these variables are too plentiful to account for, giving the illusion of subjectivity, but if we knew everything, we could make an objective choice. I won't say it's subjective just because we can't ever know all the variables, but I will say that, yeah, no perfect conjecture can be made in hyperspecific circumstances like that...

Edit:
*few HIKERS, not workers. derp

It's hard to imagine how anyone could truly subscribe to a subjective morality these days, though I think there are lesser ethical dilemmas that may be handled subjectively, depending on the needs and wants of that society.

But eventually you'll find a decision that is better for society but morally repulsive.

You're assuming our moral intuitions are correct.

There is such a thing as doing the wrong thing for the right reasons. I didn't make a claim as to which decision would be 'correct' (I'm backing subjectivity after all) since its not difficult to see things from both sides in a lot of hypothetical situations. Or for both sides to each have good enough points (or bad enough points) to have it be a toss up.

You can debate about the moral legitimacy of an action all you like--and we must--but that simply doesn't draw the logical conclusion that you ought to negate the existence of moral facts. Morality necessarily relates to human well-being.

Let's say a society decides slavery is fine, and that system results in a more efficient society and their eventual rise to power. For them it is fine, but by our moral standards it would be horrific. Whether their morals prevail over ours is purely up to who comes out on top. Right or wrong there is merely a matter of perspective, and might would inevitably make right (for either side).

I agree that ethics works on a "might makes right" system descriptively. That doesn't entail any sort of correctness, however.