The existence of sentient creatures who have the capacity to feel pain and experience suffering begets a system of ethics from which we can derive moral truths (ie. sentient beings ought not suffer gratuitously).

Well, the suffering of any creature, sentient or not, tends to beget a system of morality, but ethics as a study of human morality is a purely rational construct used to relate systems of morality to one another, as well as to analyze them. Ethics itself is logical; it depends on the application of rules to axioms and premises, as I'm sure you're aware. But these axioms and premises have to come from somewhere, and they are typically designated to be that which is self-evident. What you specify, that harm ought not to be inflicted gratuitously, is a commonly accepted beginning point; however, there are many who would disagree with you, for one reason or another. From that difference in axioms they proceed with the rational ethical process differently from you. How is this not moral relativism in action?

Because it's the only one that sings logically. It's the only one I've been able to think of that makes any rational sense. You can argue that others might disagree--but that's why we debate. If morality were subjective, it would be pointless to debate it.

And indeed we do debate it. However, I believe you have it backwards: if there were an objectively correct moral system, there would hardly be any need for ethics, as ethics would serve no purpose and there would be nothing to study or debate. It would be universally true and objectively known that that moral system was correct. Yet this is not the case. Instead, the fact that we are debating this suggests that moral relativism is indeed reflective of the nature of the world.

If the objectivist position is true, no, it does not necessarily follow that the moral system inherent would be universally known.

I'm sure we can agree that science is objective, not relative. Yet we debate it, all the time.

I understand where you're coming from with that. Sure, a "correct" morality may exist somehow, and we may not know what it is. But if you do not know what it is, or know that it does, in fact, exist, how can you make any claims to morality at all that are not contextually subjective or relativist?

I think you are confused about the difference between nature and the human study of nature. Morality COULD be objective, but ethics is not a human system of morals and is not morally objective. The laws of the universe seem to be objective for sure, but science is not a natural system of laws and is not universally objective.

Note that I am not saying that the conclusions made by science are not objectively true as far as we can tell. I am simply stating that science could be done differently. In fact, science is debated so frequently because it is NOT objective, although it attempts to make objective conclusions. Scientists strive to make these objective conclusions but science gets debated because there are sometimes "bad" scientists.

Quote from: Tsirist on September 24, 2015, 06:02:22 PM

however, there are many who would disagree with you, for one reason or another.

So we should consider the existence of non-empiricists and non-physicalists when we approach science as to make it relative?

Not at all! Yet there clearly are people who do. I don't believe we should consider those practices as good practices, yet people make wild scientific claims about vaccines, circumcision (apparently), climate change, and other things all the time, even if they're not scientifically trained. Some scientists, again, don't even reach the same conclusions as others.

This is the same in ethics. Different conclusions from different methodology or premises. The process is clearly not objective, otherwise the same conclusion would be reached. Again, neither methodology is a natural construct anyways; they are artificial, human abstractions used for useful purposes, but nothing more.

Quote from: Tsirist on September 24, 2015, 06:32:35 PM

Different conclusions from different methodology or premises.

The key being to identify the best premise, as we do in science.

How do we identify the best premises? How do we account for people who accept as best different premises from us?

I'm speaking in ontological terms, though. Epistemologically, sure, our interpretations of how the physical world functions could be considered relative, but unless you're some kind of solipsist, I think it would be silly to argue that there isn't an objective interpretation somewhere in the ether. We, as fallible humans, simply lack the sophistication required to glean the exactitude of such an interpretation.

Now, of course, I would argue that the same could be said of morality. We unearth these moral truths just as we unearth physics, and perhaps we'll never be able to realize the full extent of either, but we can make educated guesses.

Would you agree that we've made moral progress over the years?

I do consider myself a solipsist, but honestly I don't think that is relevant. As far as I'm concerned, the nature of the human being makes it impossible to identify an object interpretation or to distinguish one from such an ether. Perhaps, yes, if we were more sophisticated somehow, some conclusion could be reasonably reached, but I cannot fathom what such an evolution would like like. As humans exist right now, they are capable of having different perspectives. Morality exists as a guide to the behavior that they should exhibit, but it can be modified in the case of any individual. This quite literally embodies the idea of relativism among humans. Beyond humans? Sure, maybe. But that is a matter of faith.

In light of this, I would say that, as the trend morally as been towards a system of morals that I agree with, that yes, we have made moral progress over the years. Has it been trending towards objective morality though? Hell if I know.

Ultimately I can understand wanting to take an ontological perspective of some sort but I believe you need to qualify your statements appropriately; you are quite a silly ethicist to declare, in response to others who want to discuss your moral positions, yourself so far above moral relativists' perspectives on no other basis than that you are an objectivist. I take issue with you saying that people should not do something "just because they can" and then defending that claim by stating "according to the objective morality I believe to be out there, but that you and I do not know, it is wrong to do something just because you can without making ethical considerations". If I understood your earlier posts in this thread correctly, of course.

Again, I have no problem with you having faith in such a thing, but ignoring the fact that morality is relative among humans and then making a moral claim that would have to be considered against the objective morality you know nothing about doesn't work.

[edit:] Gotta shower, I'll be back.

I would think it has.

This seems to conflict with the relativist position, though. If morality isn't objective, the very idea of "moral progress" is moot, isn't it? If that's what you believe, then we as a society today are no more "moral" than we were back when the slave trade was still going on. That is what you must concede if you are a moral relativist. There can be no moral progress, because that implies a progression towards something greater.

Personally, I think that notion is asinine.

A more accurate statement would be that you wanted to do it. You had a desire to do something, and you did it.

From there, I can ask why you wanted to do it, and so on.

This has nothing to do with my moralistic beliefs.

I'm beginning to see a pattern here. I think when people agree that there has been moral progress, it is based on the perception that our society is better now than it was in the past. For whatever reason, the current morals of society are more beneficial to us now than they were previously. This isn't to say that they are objectively better; it is merely to say that it works better for us. Hence, we call it progress, even if it is potentially contrary to the objective morality that we cannot know.

Similarly, when people say they did something "because they could", you are right, the fact that they could didn't necessarily cause them to take that action. But the fact that they could instilled the desire in them to do it. When people say that, it is simply to say that they could think of no reason not to do it, and that their curiosity or some other emotional desire had a response to the notion that motivated them to execute the action.

In both cases I think we just have an issue of semantics. It is possible to note that people act morally relativistically to each other and still have those people declare that society is making moral progress. On the latter issue, I have to admit that I didn't think someone could take issue with that phrasing just because it isn't literal enough.

Well, this very topic has been discussed numerous times over the past couple weeks, and I've found that the easiest way to grasp my position is that morality is "subjectively objective". In short--an objective truth is out there, and we can never fully grasp it, but we can do our best. That's really it.

I can accept that. It doesn't work for me personally, but at this point in the conversation I am comfortable with what you have said, now that things are more clear.