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6.6 Summary
Despite the relatively small and limited nature of the Serbian ballistic material used in this exercise,
the findings in relation to the direct connections, and class and subclass characteristics clearly show
that there is a significant gap in the current EU and South East European Intelligence picture in this
area.
It is clear that a considerable limiting factor in current pan-European ballistic comparison activity is
that there is no one system or protocol for the ‘proactive’ correlation of ballistic material across
either the EU or South East European geographic area. That is not to say that the available IBIN
system or protocol is not helpful or supportive, however, it must be recognised that not all
territories within the region are members of Interpol. In addition, it should also be noted that a
number of countries inside the EU are not members of the IBIN network, this includes some
countries who are users of the technology utilised within the IBIN system architecture, namely IBIS.
As a result, the respective law enforcement organisations of both the EU and South East Europe are
reliant upon specific intelligence that two incidents may be linked before commissioning any cross
border comparative work to be conducted. This is completely contrary to the proactive nature of
intelligence sharing that is being advocated.
One of the key findings of the research is that considerable untapped knowledge regarding the
supply, movement, illicit manufacture, conversion, use and origins of illicit firearms lies within the
data held both within the ballistic comparison systems of EU and non-EU members, as well as within
their respective intelligence and investigative capabilities. The collection, integration, evaluation,
analysis and dissemination of the aforementioned ballistic, intelligence and reporting information
could have a significant impact on the prevalence and use of illicit firearms both within the EU and
South East Europe.

See section 7 for talking points.