But doesn't this assume that gOD's strength is bound by the laws he created and additionally exists at a constant level?

Omnipotence can either be conceived absolutely (which is patently false; God can't make a four-sided triangle) or can be either bound by logic, which is still inconsistent because there are some logical possibilities which exist which blatantly contradict one another.

The fact that it's a contradiction is the whole point of the argument. He can either be omnipotent and have a capacity to do all that is logically possible (which is necessarily inconsistent) or he isn't omnipotent.

So you can argue all day that god can't do all that is logically possible, and I'd agree.

So he is, in fact, not omnipotent and my argument is logically sound?

Great.

Yeah, but in theory an omnipotent deity wouldn't much care about logic.

The universe is omnipotent, in fact.

Quote from: Jill Valentine on February 03, 2015, 06:06:40 PM

The universe is omnipotent, in fact.

False. Omnipotence necessitates agency.

The universe could throw a black hole at us for shits and giggles.

This isn't my, or really any theologian's definition

So why did you say:

I agree with your general idea of omnipotence: it's the unlimited power to enact change within the limits of the laws of logic and physics.

It's the definition of theologians from Aquinas to Swinburne.

. . .

I think I've spotted the discrepancy here actually. I am using Aquinas's definition of omnipotence, which is that A (being omnipotent) can perform B if and only if B is a logically consistent conception of a certain state of affairs. Under this paradigm, a maker making something he cannot lift isn't contradictory and thus I can set out a number of premises which  lead to an essential falsification of Aquinas's idea of omnipotence.

You're using a more modern and restricted definition of omnipotence which is that A can perform B if and only if "A does B" is a logically consistent 'set'. In which case, it avoids the problem of God being able to perform contradictory logical possibilities, since it factors God into the equation itself. I don't particularly like it, but I'm willing to concede the logical validity of your argument here.

The question of whether God can turn blue into green is not the same as my own position, however, as that really is logically impossible. Everything I've set out is a logically possible state of affairs, but you're used a definition which is revised down in scope, essentially. But at this point, whether or not God can turn blue into green is a non-question, since we've worked out the divergence >.>

. . .

Would it be fair to say, therefore, that your conception of God's omnipotence is God doing whatever is logically possible within his nature? God cannot do any action which is a logical possibility because is leads to contradictions, but you remedy this by saying God cannot lie (despite this being a logical possibility) because it isn't within God's nature to lie. Therefore, the nature of A makes it logically inconsistent for it to perform B?

So, God can't create an immovable object, because it isn't within his nature to do so?

Quote from: Meta Cognition on February 03, 2015, 07:16:38 PM

Quote from: HurtfulTurkey on February 03, 2015, 07:11:11 PM

. . .

Would it be fair to say, therefore, that your conception of God's omnipotence is God doing whatever is logically possible within his nature? God cannot do any action which is a logical possibility because is leads to contradictions, but you remedy this by saying God cannot lie (despite this being a logical possibility) because it isn't within God's nature to lie. Therefore, the nature of A makes it logically inconsistent for it to perform B?

So, God can't create an immovable object, because it isn't within his nature to do so?

Yeah, I have so far avoided using the phrase "in his nature" because that typically results in eye rolls and dismissing the argument. I see it as valid, but it also feels like a lazy way out of a discussion of logic. But yeah, I think Aquinas would also have used that phrasing. He does say that God's omnipotence is derived from and characterized by his nature. And that's where you get arguments that try to frame those contradictions and possible-impossibilities such as God lying or sinning as illogical.

Isn't that just tautological, though?

1. God's "nature" is omnipotent.

2. Omnipotence is doing whatever is logically possible within God's nature.

What is God's nature?

1. God's nature is omnipotent. . .

God's nature is divine, and his omnipotence is characterized by that nature. Assume that there was a second omnipotent being (for all I know, there could be) --  I don't think it's inconsistent to say that God's omnipotence is defined by his divinity, or holiness, or whatever you want to say, but also say that another omnipotent being's power could be defined by something else, which we'd need some basis to describe. I don't really want to go down that rabbit hole, but all I [think] I'm saying is that omnipotence doesn't necessitate divinity, and neither does divinity necessitate omnipotence, so it's not tautological.

Okay, that makes sense.

Some things seem impossible when you think of them, like a planet forming, or the universe, physics, the vastness of space, etc...

But if we filmed where the very first humans 24/7 and how they developed with cameras there'd be no great mystery there.

P1: God is omnipotent.

P2: Omnipotence is the power to do all things logically possible.

P3: Something is logically possible is any coherent action which can be expressed without contradiction.
3a: Any action which has ever been done before is logically possible.

P4: It is logically possible to create a finite mass of rock that cannot be lifted by its own maker (from P3).

P5: Therefore, an omnipotent being can create a finite mass of rock which cannot be lifted by its own maker (from P2 & P4).

P6: Therefore, an omnipotent being can create a finite mass of rock which cannot be lifted by an omnipotent being.

P7: For any finite mass of rock, it is logically possible to generate a force that will lift it against a uniform gravitational field (2nd Law of Motion).

P8: Therefore, an omnipotent being can lift any finite mass of rock (from P2 and P7).

P9: Premise 6 and Premise 8 are contradictions.

P10: Therefore, it is logically impossible to be omnipotent.

C: Therefore, God is logically impossible.

This logic is undeniable! That's why I admire you Meta. Now, let's do reincarnation next.

ITT: Semantics wars

Well duh. That's like walking into a 2001 thread and saying "ITT: sci fi."

I feel I should restate the fact that I am not, and indeed cannot, disproving the existence of a creator deity. "God exists"  is a synthetic proposition with empirical content not falsifiable by logic alone. Indeed, analytic propositions and deduction can only tell us about the relations between certain ideas.

All my argument shows is that our conception of an omnipotent God (defined as A being able to perform B if and only if B is a logically possible state of affairs) is necessarily contradictory and therefore, by definition, not possible. All this shows is that either our conception of God or ommipotence is necessarily wrong and must be revised to some degree.

Turkey's conception of omnipotence, which is increasingly popular but poorly formulated--largely due to the sheer similarity--essentially factors God into the equation and defines omnipotence as A being able to do B if and only if A doing B is a logically coherent situation. I think this has its own problems, and I'm not convinced its entirely commensurate with Scripture, but that's not the conception of omnipotence being disproved.

ITT: Semantics wars

THAT'S RACI--oh. my bad.