CAN'T MOSSAD THE ASSAD

Looks good with one simple read through. Did not give much focus to the topic and the details.

Source

So this thread is mainly to discuss the waning strength of the Russian power. Although they are engaged in a conflict and are close to annexing parts of Ukraine, they still seem to be losing at the end of the day. The article that i copy pasted below may help in outlining these points.

When a group of weary diplomats announced a framework for an Iranian nuclear accord last week in Lausanne, there was one diplomat in the mix whose feigned enthusiasm was hard to miss. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov left the talks at their most critical point March 30, much to the annoyance of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, who apparently had to call him personally to persuade him to return. Even as Lavrov spoke positively to journalists about the negotiations throughout the week, he still seemed to have better things to do than pull all-nighters for a deal that effectively gives the United States one less problem to worry about in the Middle East and a greater capacity to focus on the Russian periphery.

Russia has no interest in seeing a nuclear-armed Iran in the neighborhood, but the mere threat of an unshackled Iranian nuclear program and a hostile relationship between Washington and Tehran provided just the level of distraction Moscow needed to keep the United States from committing serious attention to Russia's former Soviet sphere.

Russia tried its best to keep the Americans and Iranians apart. Offers to sell Iran advanced air defense systems were designed to poke holes in U.S. threats to bomb Iranian nuclear facilities. Teams of Russian nuclear experts whetted Iran's appetite for civilian nuclear power with offers to build additional power reactors. Russian banks did their part to help Iran circumvent financial sanctions. The Russian plan all along was not to help Iran get the bomb, but to use its leverage with a thorny player in the Middle East to get the United States into a negotiation on issues vital to Russia's national security interests. So, if Washington wanted to resolve its Iran problem, it would have to pull back on issues like ballistic missile defense in Central Europe, which Moscow saw early on as the first of several U.S. steps to encircle Russia.

Things obviously did not work according to the Russian plan. As we anticipated, the United States and Iran ultimately came together in a bilateral negotiation to resolve their main differences. Now the United States and Iran are on a path toward normalization at a time when Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying simultaneously to defend against a U.S.-led military alliance building along Russia's European frontier and to manage an economic crisis and power struggle at home. And the situation does not look any better for Russia on the energy front.

Russia Stands to Lose Energy Revenue

The likelihood of the United States and Iran reaching a deal this summer means that additional barrels of Iranian oil eventually will make their way to the market, further depressing the price of oil, as well as the Russian ruble. To be clear, Iranian oil is not going to flood the market instantaneously with the signing of a deal. Iran is believed to have as much as 35 million barrels of crude in storage that it could offload quickly once export sanctions are terminated by the Europeans and eased by the United States via presidential waiver. But Iran will face complications in trying to bring its mature fields back online. Enhanced recovery techniques to revive mothballed fields take money and infrastructure, which is difficult to apply when oil prices are hovering around $50 per barrel. Under current conditions, Iran can bring some 400,000-500,000 barrels per day back online over the course of a year, but this will be a gradual process as Iran vies for foreign investment in its dilapidated energy sector.

U.S. investors will likely remain shackled by the core Iran Sanctions Act until at least the end of 2016, when the legislation is set to expire. However, European and Asian investors will be among the first to begin repairing Iran's oil fields, as long as Iran does its part in improving contractual terms and the economics make sense for firms already cutting back their capital expenditures.

Europe's New Options

The rehabilitation of Iran's energy sector, however gradual a process that may be, will complicate Russia's uphill battle in trying to maintain its energy leverage over Europe. Russia is a critical supplier of energy to Europe, currently providing about 29 percent and 37 percent of Europe's natural gas and oil needs, respectively. An additional 50 billion cubic meters of natural gas available for export from the United States within the next five years will not be able to compete with Russia on price due to the low operational and transport costs of Russian natural gas. Even so, the United States will still be creating more supply in the natural gas market overall to give Europe the option of paying more for its energy security should the political considerations outweigh the economic cost. The Baltic states are already working toward this option, with Lithuania taking the lead in creating a mini-liquefied natural gas hub for the region to try to reduce, if not eliminate, Baltic dependence on Russia. This year, Poland is debuting its own LNG facility, and the Sabine Pass terminal in Louisiana is scheduled to bring the first LNG exports from the Lower 48 to market, with shipments already contracted for Asia.

In Southern Europe, the picture for Russia is more complicated but still distressing. Aside from the significant issue of cost for energy companies already cutting their capital expenditures, Turkey's veto on the transit of LNG tankers through the Bosporus effectively neutralizes any LNG import facility project on the Black Sea. But Europe is proceeding apace with the much more economically palatable option of building pipeline interconnectors across southeastern Europe. This does little to dilute Russia's control over energy supply, but it does strip Moscow of its ability to politicize pricing in Europe. Pipeline politics in Europe have allowed Russia to reward — and punish — its Eastern European neighbors through pricing contracts. However, Brussels is more thoroughly examining contracts signed by EU member states for this very reason and in line with one of the main tenets of the EU's Third Energy Package, which seeks to break monopolies by splitting energy production and transmission and to implement fair pricing. Meanwhile, the construction of interconnectors allows member states to influence pricing downstream from Russia.

This gambit has been on display over the past year in Ukraine. Kiev depended heavily on its neighbors in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary for reverse flows of Russian natural gas at discounted rates to stand up to Russia's energy swaggering. Though Russian natural gas will still be flowing primarily through these pipelines, the expansion of interconnectors will open up options for non-Russian natural gas from the North Sea and from LNG terminals in Northern Europe to make their way southward to embattled frontline states such as Ukraine.

Russia thought it would be able to keep a hook in Southern Europe through the construction of South Stream, a mammoth pipeline project with a $30 billion price tag and 63-bcm capacity that sought to cut Ukraine out of the equation by moving natural gas across the Black Sea and through the Balkans and Central Europe. The combination of plunging energy prices and growing EU resistance to another pipeline that would allow Russia to draw political favors sent this project to the graveyard, but Russia had a backup plan. The Turkish Stream pipeline would make landfall in Turkey after crossing the Black Sea, before using the Trans Adriatic Pipeline and the Trans Anatolian Pipeline to feed Southern Europe through the web of interconnectors and pipelines already in development. On the surface, Moscow's plan appears quite brilliant: Use the very infrastructure that Europe was already counting on to diversify away from Russia and then, when the political skirmishing over Ukraine eventually settles down, reinsert itself into Europe's energy mix via a willing partner like Turkey.

Post-South Stream Options
Click to Enlarge
But the plan remains full of holes. Someone needs to pay for the main pipeline expansion between Russia and Turkey, and both countries will struggle to find private investors in this geopolitical and pricing climate. Moreover, there is no indication that the Europeans will be willing to take additional Russian natural gas from a yet-to-be-built Turkish Stream when a perfectly good pipeline running from Russia to Eastern Europe already exists. Russia does not have the option of refusing natural gas shipments when it is already desperate for those energy revenues. In the end, this is a Russian bluff that the Europeans will not be afraid to call. When Putin agreed to a three-month natural gas deal with Ukraine last week (with a huge discount to boot, at $247.20 per thousand cubic meters), he likely did so realizing that Russia playing hardball with Ukraine on energy would only spur further investment and construction into pipelines and connectors in southeastern Europe that would accelerate the decline of Russia's energy influence in Europe. The best he can hope for is to slow that timeline down.

Not only will Russia's pricing leverage wane in Europe over the long term, but its influence on Europe's energy supply also will decrease over the longer run. Azerbaijan was the first southern corridor supplier to Europe circumventing Russia and is now expanding that role by bringing natural gas from its Shah Deniz II offshore fields online for export. Turkmenistan is still vulnerable to Russian meddling but has been increasingly willing to host Turkish and European investors looking to build a pipeline across the Caspian to feed Europe. Whether these talks translate into action will depend on the Turkmen government's political will to stand up to Moscow, not to mention legal battles over the Caspian Sea. But while the lengthy courting of Ashgabat by the West continues, a rehabilitated Iran is now the latest addition to the list to join the southern corridor.

Russia's Influence Wanes in the Middle East

Just a day after the Iranian nuclear framework deal was announced, Russia's state-owned RIA Novosti published a story quoting Igor Korotchenko, the head of the Moscow-based Center for Analysis of World Arms Trade, as saying it would be a "perfectly logical development" for Russia to follow through on a sale of S-300 surface-to-air missiles to Iran if the embargo is lifted. Korotchenko noted that specifications to the deal would have to be made as "the United States is watching very closely" to whom Russia sells these weapons. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also made a point to say the U.N. arms embargo against Iran should be lifted as part of the nuclear deal. These well-timed statements likely caught Washington's eye but probably did little to impress. The S-300 threat mattered a lot more when the United States needed to maintain a credible military deterrent against Iran. If the United States and Iran reach an understanding that neutralizes that threat through political means, Russian talk of S-300s is mostly hot air.

This was a small, yet revealing illustration of Russia's declining position in the Middle East. For many years, the Middle East was a rose garden for the Russians, filled with both sweet-smelling opportunities to lure Washington into negotiations and ample thorns to prick their American adversary when the need arose. Russia's support for the Syrian government is still relevant, and Moscow will continue to court countries in the region with arms deals out of both political and economic necessity. Even so, bringing down the Syrian government is not on Washington's to-do list, and countries like Egypt will still end up prioritizing their relationship with the United States in the end.

Russia's influence in the Middle East is fading rapidly at the same time Europe is starting to wriggle out of Russia's energy grip. And as Russia's options are narrowing, U.S. options are multiplying in both the Middle East and Europe. This is an uncomfortable situation for Putin, to be sure. But a narrow set of options for Russia in its near abroad does not make those options any less concerning for the United States as the standoff between Washington and Moscow continues.

TLDR:
The main point of concern in this article is that with the rise of deals with Iran and America the actions by the Baltic nations away from dependency of Russian resources, one comes down to the conclusion that Russia although looking the strongest it has ever been since the fall of the Soviet Union is just an injured beast lashing out and trying its best to remain relevant in the modern political and economic world. Relying on a number of contingency plans just to stay on top.

So anyway what do you guys think about the Russian might and where it may go from here?

Sokka, Jet, umm the gramps? Not sure who.

Convert. Too much of a pussy. Still though would be wary of amy resistance group unless they are people i cam trust. You cam never know if you will be backstabbed. And trust me i could easily become one of the countless failed resistance.

Honest question but which military army in any war has not been faced with these issues? Honestly even in Vietnam and other wars, diseases spread due to the mass of rotting and dying bodies plus the drop in hygiene.

This just seems like stupid propaganda to make everyone feel good. Which is stupid.

Don't we have an international ban on orbital based weapons platforms?
I don't see satellites having any more of a role than communications, guiding, and tracking relays.

Well, yeah i mean Satellites are important but you do not need orbital based weapons to fight in space. These include jamming communication relays and causing chaos to existing hardware that rely on gps systems.

>Calling an LSD trip like that a kid's show
>Only excuse would be the regular show since it literally is an LSD trip

What about Adventure Time?

And the original Courage the Cowardly Dog and its pal SpongeBob.
The first i remember in this genre.

Have they become more mature or am i imagining things?/s

uh i like this documentary a lot

very interesting to me

YouTube

No wonder you like it. Also the people on there are kind of interesting to say the least.

Also the Shady Project is a doc i like


And the documentary "It Might Get Loud" focusing around Jimmy Page, Jack White and the Edge.

Album should have up to 10 to 12 songs at max, ranging from half an hour to 45 minutes due to people losing interest in a long time. Also for fear that some of the songs at the very end may be ignored. Which is why a 30 minutes to 45 minutes is a great length to look at.

Quote from: Risay117 on March 31, 2015, 06:51:21 PM

Has anyone noticed how yound some of the dads are. Other than that it is kind of cute.

Asias don't age.

Hideo Kojima is 51.

Spoiler

Well it fixed but must say he does seem kind of old. Like 40+ but not 50

Has anyone noticed how yound some of the dads are. Other than that it is kind of cute.

What is TPP?
So most of you if have been keeping eyes on the world trade would notice the creation and negotiation of a trade agreement called the Trans Pacific Partnership, composing of 12 countries.

1.Australia
2.Brunei
3.Canada
4.Chile
5.Japan
6.Malaysia
7.Mexico
8.New Zealand
9.Peru
10.Singapore
11.United States
12.Vietnam


The agreement although composing of small number of countries does include some major economic powers, with the first being United State, and the Asian Tiger Singapore. The secrecy of the negotiations has drawn many critics mainly due to unknown nature of the talks. With two more Asian Tigers showing interest one being South Korea and the second being Taiwan. The main talking points are as below:

Main Goals

Comprehensive market access by eliminating tariffs and other barriers to goods and services trade and investment, so as to create new opportunities for our workers and businesses and immediate benefits for our consumers.
A fully regional agreement by facilitating the development of production and supply chains among TPP members, which will support the goals of job creation, improving living standards and welfare, and promoting sustainable growth among member countries.
Cross-cutting trade issues by building on work being done in APEC and other fora by incorporating four new cross-cutting issues in the TPP. These issues are:
Regulatory coherence: Commitments will promote trade between the countries by making trade among them more seamless and efficient.
Competitiveness and business facilitation: Commitments will enhance the domestic and regional competitiveness of each member country's economy and promote economic integration and jobs in the region, including through the development of regional production and supply chains.
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises: Commitments will address concerns small- and medium-sized businesses have raised about the difficulty in understanding and using trade agreements, encouraging these sized enterprises to trade internationally.
Development: Comprehensive and robust market liberalisation, improvements in trade and investment enhancing disciplines, and other commitments will serve to strengthen institutions important for economic development and governance and thereby contribute significantly to advancing TPP countries' respective economic development priorities.
New trade challenges by promoting trade and investment in innovative products and services, including the digital economy and green technologies, and to ensure a competitive business environment across the TPP region.
Living agreement by enabling the updating of the agreement when needed to address trade issues that materialise in the future as well as new issues that arise with the expansion of the agreement to include new countries.

[3]

Criticism and Opposition
A number of issues though have been brought up mainly as below and many disagreements exist the most notable:

Intellectual Property Rights:

There has been many issues with this section of the TPP, especially with America's push on placing it's intellectual property laws onto other countries most notably Korea that go far beyond the Korean-US Trade Agreement. With another fear being how the laws could effect the availability of medication in the lower and less prosperous countries and their citizens.

Though much information is not available other than the leaked documents the section covers an array of topics that include

agreement's discussions thus far have included trademark, geographical indication, copyright and related rights, patents, trade secrets, genetic resources, and traditional knowledge.

[1]

Investor State Arbitration

According to some interpretation some of the laws could force signatories to adapt their domestic laws to conform with the TPP, thus decreasing their control over law making and how they spend their taxes. The biggest concern was that the US were pushing for a Investor State Dispute Settlement Mechanism mainly a Corporate Tribunal[2], where a nations domestic laws can be challenged by corporations. Although this mechanism is common in many trade agreements.

The biggest critics though say that the system would affect a number of laws including environmental, human rights and public welfare regulations. With fears that the laws can force states to lower their standards from what they originally were set at. The biggest fear is that the provision would give corporations the ability to sue countries for lost revenue at the taxpayers expense.

Other than the above stated concerns some of the still existing concerns were that the Japanese Auto Tariff would remain in place although the trade agreement was supposed to remove all tariffs and the fear of currency manipulation.

On the other hand there is another FTA that is right now growing called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP) composing of a number of nations most notably China, and India also including some of the states that are also involved in the TPP talks.

Why did i make a thread about this
Cause i was wondering how you guys feel with this new partnership and is it a good idea and should be focused in this trade agreement and what should be removed.

Also if you want to here is the Trade Minister's report to their Leaders a 4 page document for your own reading.
Link

Also posted in the sources.

Sources:
[1]
[2][url=http://www.thenation.com/article/168627/nafta-steroids#]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Pacific_Partnership_intellectual_property_provisions#cite_note-6[/ur]
[2][url]http://www.thenation.com/article/168627/nafta-steroids#]http://www.thenation.com/article/168627/nafta-steroids#]http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Pacific_Partnership_intellectual_property_provisions#cite_note-6[/ur]
[2][url]http://www.thenation.com/article/168627/nafta-steroids#
[3]https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/tpp%20trade%20ministers%20report%20to%20leaders%2010082013.pdf

Quote from: Risay117 on March 30, 2015, 10:36:11 PM

Quote from: Arm The Mob on March 30, 2015, 10:29:30 PM

Quote from: GethKhilafah on March 29, 2015, 03:23:35 PM

If Saddam Hussein stayed in power, Iraq would have exploded worse than Syria right now. So I'm actually somewhat grateful for the US/UK for ending Saddam Hussein before Iraq could have been totally destroyed by him.

This.

Obviously we can't know for sure what might have gone down had he lived and ruled until natural death, but it would not be good.

I imagine it would be somewhat like what went down in the Balkans after Tito croaked, probably worse.

I kind of agree and disagree as this is well based on hypothethical decisions.

People who think Iraq--IRAQ--would've been more stable after Sta- sorry, Saddam kicked the bucket don't know what they're talking about. I mean, I posted a story today about Iran suddenly refusing to hand over her nuclear stockpiles as part of the nuclear talks.

This is not a stable, trust-able region in the world.

About Iran, they are quite stable and there is hope of progress on that front with diplomacy. Also must say that most of their nuclear stockpile is being downgraded if not all to a level only useful for medical and energy use. Nothing else.

Honestly it is an interesting scenario where Saudi's and Isreal find themselves on the same side when they are supposed to be on the opposite. Personally i believe the region needs to mature and soon some source of advancement and normality will come. It sounds kind of horrible saying it as i am basically saying that people lives do not matter in the grand scheme of things.