Gotye - Somebody That I Used To Know

You should fucking kill yourself.

>neuroanatomical differences associated with gender identity.
>neuroanatomical
>anatomical

Come on, Verb, you know that's ridiculously fucking reductionist.

To actually quote the study in context: "neuroanatomical differences associated with gender identity."

This means that gender identity is associated with biological variations in the nervous system. Defining it as sex simply because it includes biology is ridiculous; sex is about your genitalia/chromosomal make-up, gender is about personal perception. Nothing about the definition of gender precludes biological explanations for such phenomena, and it's ridiculous to pre-suppose that it does.

The word "gender" isn't even used once in the entire article.

Fortunately for the article, CTRL+F doesn't capture the whole picture; it is clearly talking about gendered behaviour (bearing in mind the study was written in 2000, so I'm not at all surprised they don't use the term gender):

The present study aimed to ascertain whether the sexual dimorphism is a result of biological or socio-cultural differences between the two sexes. 102 human neonates, who by definition have not yet been influenced by social and cultural factors, were tested to see if there was a difference in looking time at a face (social object) and a mobile (physical-mechanical object). Results showed that the male infants showed a stronger interest in the physical-mechanical mobile while the female infants showed a stronger interest in the face. The results of this research clearly demonstrate that sex differences are in part biological in origin

If the study were solely about sex as we define it today, the underlined passages would make literally no sense, and I have seen interviews of Simon Baron-Cohen as recent as 2010 where he explicitly states the findings of the study are to do with gendered behaviour. It's pretty clear, in context, that this is what "sexual dimorphism" refers to.

I don't know, maybe it's just to help rid the idea that people have to stick strictly to specified gender roles.

Not many people outside of ultra-conservative nuts are doing this, though. There are greater differences between men and women in freer, more egalitarian countries in both labour market outcomes and actual personality.

OT: Government should remove multilingual translations from documents, but that's about it.

Quote from: SpartanT on September 09, 2015, 08:22:18 PM

Maybe people are just picking and choosing to fit their agenda, I don't know.

Basically any time science meets politics.

Apparently biological sciences have a really terrible time getting funding in Norway because of the generally-progressive political climate.

It's not as bad as the word "egregious".

Jesus fuck, that's awful.

Surprised, disturbed, confused, etc.

FUCK MOVE THIS

Jesus Fuck.

Why does this still not make sense to me.

Think of it this way:

We get facts from physics, not because we actually study reality (which you realise when looking at the philosophy), but because we have defined physics in such a way as to yield useful results about the world we find ourselves in. We acquire knowledge by defining the terms of our study and then drawing conclusions.

Think of it like a filter that you put sentences into, then apply an algorithm which then yields a binary result of either "True" or "False".

We argue it's the same as morality. We simply have to identify the best definition of morality, and thus the facts will follow.

I plan on doing a post on epistemology and truth, however, just to elucidate on how definitions fit into the whole scheme of things.

because morals are based around said purpose.

I don't see why you would define morality as to necessitate some kind of transcendent, intrinsic purpose. Do you see? You are defining morality so as to essentially pre-assume a morally nihilistic (or subjectivist) perspective. This is what I mean: the definition leads to the facts. If you do indeed define morality that way, then it is true there are no objective moral facts--because 'truth' is an epistemic label we apply after running propositions through our epistemology, it isn't an intrinstic or Platonic property. The actual question is whether or not you have the best definition for morality.

Wouldn't my definition of morality be subjective itself? Because if it was objective, there would only be one definition, the 'true' definition. But even if it wasn't subjective, what 'facts' would there be, anyway?

I suppose you could say it allows for a minor degree of relativism. But, let's apply that thought to epistemology: if epistemologies are wholly relative, is an epistemology based on evidence and logic precisely equal to an epistemology based on faith and dogma? I'd argue no, there is indeed a superior--are more useful--epistemological stance in the first option.

Or, let's apply it to physics: what if people defined physics in such a way as to include the study of the supernatural and the transcendent? I think we would all agree this would be a poor definition with very, very little utility.

Think of it this way: all human activity--the study of everything--has to begin from the basis of an assumed "perspective". Not all perspectives, however, are created equal; there are better and worse perspective for conducting physics, chemistry, economics and--this is the point--I would argue morality too.

Hopefully they're not communist aliens.

The only thing that could make that worse is if they were also a Muslim.

Unfortunately, we already have a Muslim Communist Alien in the White House.

You should calculate the odds of God being real.

I doubt he'd be able to do that if he isn't doing Bayesian probability.

Fortunately, I'm a layman.

Definitions:

1) X is any arbitrary event. (I was born in Germany.)

2) ¬X denotes "not X". (I was not born in Germany.)

3) E represents the existence of positive evidence that indicate X is correct. (My birth certificate is from Germany.)

4) ¬E denotes "not E", or the total absence of positive evidence.

5) P(X) denotes the probability of X.

6) P(X|E) denotes the conditional probability of X given E; this is the joint probability of X and E divided by the probability of E.

P(X|E) = P(X^E) / P(E)

Assumption (1):
- If an event like X were to really have happened, then it very likely left some evidence of itself. In other words, the probability of E, given X, is greater than the probability of NOT E, given X.

P(E|X) > P(¬E|X)

1 - P(¬E|X) > P(¬E|X)

P(¬E|X) < 1/2

This isn't an unfair assumption, as most things of significance leave some sort of evidence.

Now we invoke Bayes' Theorem: P(¬E|X) = P(X|¬E)P(¬E) / P(X).

-> 1/2 > P(X|¬E)P(¬E) / P(X)

P(X|¬E) < (1/2) P(X)/P(¬E)

Thinking about P(X) in the equation immediately prior, is X a likely or unlikely event?

Assumption 2:
- The event X is extraordinary. P(X) << 1. The probability of event X is very small.

Let X be an intersection of two statistically independent events, A and B. X = A^B. (I was born in Germany, and I love shitting on my neighbour's lawn.) However, the joint probability of A and B is always equal to or less than the probability of A or B. P(AB) = P(A)P(B). The more events which define X, the lower the probability.

Returning to the emboldened equation, consider the term P(¬E). What can we say about the likelihood of evidence for X?

Assumption 3:
- We have searched for evidence of X, but failed to find any. P(¬E) [approx.]= 1. The probability of no actual evidence for X is very high, and the more we search for E but fail, the closer this value approaches 1.

Bringing forward the emboldened equation again:

P(X|¬E) < (1/2) P(X)/P(¬E)

The more specific and extraordinary X, the closer P(X) is to 0. And the more we search for evidence, but fail, the closer ¬E is to 1. The ratio here [P(X)/P(¬E)] then, must be very small. As long as this ratio is less than one, the entire right-hand side of the inequality is less than one-half.

P(X|¬E) < 1/2. This inequality must hold. This implies: P(¬X|¬E) > 1/2.

We finally arrive at:

P(¬X|¬E) > P(X|¬E). In other words, given an absence of any evidence for X, the more likely event is that X did not, in fact, occur.

This is a demonstration of the epistemic principle known as the inference to the best explanation. Many things cannot be known with absolute certainty, but we can show which explanations are most preferable.

Recap:
1) An event like X should leave evidence.
2) All things being equal, X is unlikely.
3) We have searched for evidence of X, but failed.

From these premises, it mathematically follows that ¬X is a more likely event than X.

Let X be the following claim:

The Virgin Mary, upon being impregnated by Yahweh, gave birth to a half-blooded demigod named Jesus of Nazareth. During his life, Jesus performed many miracles that included healing the sick, raising the dead and turning water into wine. Jesus also took the aggregate sins of humanity upon himself, and gave his own life for us. Upon his execution by Roman authorities, Jesus rose from the dead and ascended to Heaven. All of these events were compiled into the record, with inerrancy, known as the New Testament.

And anybody who fails to believe this will spend an eternity in endless suffering.

If any of this is to be the case, we should find evidence beyond mere say-so.

P(E|X) > P(¬E|X).

X is a huge intersection of independent events, all competing with the various denominations and interpretations of Christian doctrine which is, in turn, competing with those belonging to other religions. Significant positive evidence for Christianity is yet to have been found, also.

P(X) [appox.]= 0.

P(¬E) [approx.]= 1.

P(¬X|¬E) [approx.]= 1. Quad erat demonstrandum.

But the fact that we can debate mortality inherently means it can't be objective

"I'm a Christian Chemist, and I don't think water is made of two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen because God made water before stars, and it would be Biblically inelegant."

Of course this is a silly example, but it's nevertheless valid. Of course you can engage in debates about the objective; to use an example in which one party is not so obviously empirically incorrect, just think of the current debates in theoretical physics surrounding string theory, loop quantum gravity, et cetera. The fact that physicists are debating these issues and trying to reach the truth doesn't negate the fact that objective truth exists.

Indeed, you and I could begin debating something already well-established now. Because objectivity is not contingent on our perception of it.

I might do a post on epistemology and truth actually, since a lot of people find it really confusing.