So, despite my nominally supportive position of Verbatim in that little debate, I'm not an anti-natalist. The best argument I can come up against anti-natalism will be laid out (probably haphazardly) ahead. I call it, the Problem of Parsimony.

So, it seems the moral foundation of anti-natalism is avoiding the actualisation of disutility--or, in other words, the imposition of disutility--in the form of procreation. I'm using disutility instead of suffering here, as it's clearly possible for suffering to engender some long-term benefits for a person, whereas disutility is--by definition--wholly undesirable (suffering - long-term benefit = disutility).

Anti-natalism falls down, it seems to me, in its conception of disutility. All disutility, to the anti-natalists, is equal in magnitude and moral "transgression". This, seems to me, to be false. It is worth quantifying disutility into at least two categories: significant disutility, and standard disutility. Significant disutility would be something seriously impinging on well-being (genocide), whereas standard disutility is closer to something like discomfort. It also stands to reason, therefore, that there are two kinds of utilities: significant and standard. Significant utility can properly be defined as the repudiation and transcendence of standard disutility, whereas standard utility is the mere avoidance or transcendence of significant disutility.

Now, the specific problem with anti-natalism is something I like to refer to as temporal suspension; it is locked in one frozen conception of the potential state of disutility, and the imposition of life is necessarily an actualisation of this potential state. What if, however, the potential state of disutility could be altered as to effectively exclude significant disutility, leaving only standard disutility as a thing to object to. My argument relies on the fundamental premise that the abolition of significant disutility is possible, via technology.

Represented at its most simply: significant disutility = -2, standard disutility = -1, standard utility = 0 and significant utility = 2. Under a paradigm of potential disutility involving significance, you get -1, with the only moral response being to not impose life. Under a paradigm in which potential disutility doesn't involve significance then you get 1.

In such an instance whereby significant disutility is not a potentiality, yet both kinds of utility are potentialities, it actually becomes more moral to strive for the continuation of the species with the expressed goal of eliminated significant disutility.

You might think it's right to feed your kid a hundred pounds of junk food, just because he wants it. But you'd be wrong, quite obviously.

Never because I would want humanity to keep going. I want my legacy and genes to keep going.

Shit could be an ice age with only 15 people on earth and I'd try to have as many kids as possible.

Even if I hit rock bottom, I wouldn't out of sheer defiance.

I'm gonna step out for awhile. I've been sitting here for five hours.

I'll have your response, Meta. Hopefully you won't lose interest by then.

Funny shit like this is why I love lurking in Serious. 

But to want to throw away everything mankind has worked towards? Lol fucking retarded.

Verbatim isn't arguing for some sort of coercive "don't have kids" law. He said a couple of pages in how he doesn't chastise people for having kids, but merely tries to dissuade them before the fact.

Don't lie, if there was an actual bill for that he'd be all for it.

I find it funny that you accuse me of lying and then claim to be able to authoritatively speak for Verbatim. I'm just telling you what he has said.

Also he did say that he'd push the red button.

He also said he preferred my reformulation of the deletion of the capacity to procreate, not the deletion of all life.

I would stop caring and commit suicide before I became an antinatalist.

Its like the ultimate hipster opinion to think the human race should die off, but sticking around just to bitch at everyone else having a good time. Why anyone would care enough about whether other people have kids to hold it as a party line/philosophical belief is beyond me. Especially when you know the species / universe will die off eventually anyways.

A better question is why you're so afraid of suffering.

A better question is why you're so afraid of suffering.

For what must be the eight time, it's a question of disutility (suffering - engendered benefits).

Again so what? If death out weighs life for you

Again, not even what he's arguing.

Suffering is how the individual grows. It is how the species grows. This agrument essentially boils down to 'life isn't fair'.

I just said we aren't solely talking about suffering. Verbatim isn't denying the potential usefulness of suffering.

But then to make the jump to say no one else should have kids?

It stands to reason that if you aren't going to have kids because it represents a moral transgression then--assuming this moral transgression is indeed true--others also shouldn't have kids.

It does not stand to reason.

It does assuming the moral transgression is a legitimate moral transgression.

A. Your outlook, morals, and situation are not the same as everyone else's.

Since when did the the existence of alternative opinions automatically convey legitimacy. Vladimir Putin has an idea on the best way to structure an economy, but that doesn't make him correct.

2. If the species/universe will eventually die off anyways trying to kill it off early is ultimately pointless.

I actually agree with this; I don't think anti-natalism is a 'practical' philosophy. But that's not what we're discussing. We're discussing its philosophical strength.

C. It will never happen.

Well this is just the same as the point above, really.