Moral nihilism is, if I've got this right, a meta-ethical position; that's to say, it rejects moral universals in metaphysics or divine command theory. It doesn't necessarily reject moral realism, and I think the two can happily coexist, actually.
Aren't you a nihilist though?
You say here's no value in life
You constantly say life has no intrinsic value, and you hope all sentient life is ended.
Quote from: Pendulate on June 22, 2015, 07:03:32 AMMoral nihilism is, if I've got this right, a meta-ethical position; that's to say, it rejects moral universals in metaphysics or divine command theory. It doesn't necessarily reject moral realism, and I think the two can happily coexist, actually.I don't think so. Moral nihilism is, by definition, an anti-realist philosophy in meta-ethics. It doesn't just reject moral universals, it rejects all positive moral claims.
My problem with moral nihilism (speaking as a former nihilist, no less) is its complete unwillingness to make the presuppositions necessary to reach moral facts. Or indeed any facts. The whole of epistemology is a presupposition, the point is making the right presuppositions. And when it comes to morality, you either make the presupposition or you don't. And if you don't, you're either religious or a nihilist.
Hmm, wouldn't that take it outside the realm of meta-ethics, then?
But you say life has no value
Absence of pain exists. When you laugh, it's nothing but pure pleasure. Same with sex, or doing an activity you really enjoy. You can escape from pain, even if it is only for a little while. Pain is very important to feel. It teaches us and gives us understanding. Without pain, we wouldn't be what we are today.
Not really, for the same reason that metaphysical nihilism is still a part of metaphysics or that epistemological nihilism is still part of epistemology. The fact that they reject the very existence of ethical properties is still a meta-ethical claim.
I think that makes sense. But, in the case of moral realism, would a nihilist be rejecting the moral precepts laid out (namely, that we can derive prescriptive norms from descriptive facts about experience) or would they be rejecting the assertion that experiences have descriptive value altogether?If it's the latter, then wouldn't it be a case of conflating metaphysical value with empirical value? Because it's quite clear that experiences have values, at least in a subjective sense, in that some are more or less desirable than others. I don't know how a nihilist could dispute that without falling back on metaphysics.
Nobody's imposing anything on anybody. Everybody tries to avoid pain for their loved ones.
All of us dying won't fix the issue.
one could be both an anti-natalist and a nihilist, no?
Quote from: Snake on June 22, 2015, 11:49:39 AMone could be both an anti-natalist and a nihilist, no?I can't say I agree with Verbatim's more colourful conclusions in the OP, but this would still be a contradiction in terminus. Being an anti-natalist requires the attribution of objective disutility to life.
Nobody's imposing anything on anybody.
Would it not be possible for you to consider one to be a decent human being AND a Nihilist but only in regards to oneself? For example, what if someone established that there is no point to theirs or other's lives but still maintained not to impose this on other people? Coming to the conclusion of "there is no point to anything, but my viewpoint does not give me the right to impose it on others by making their lives worse."
Meta summed it up rather well. If you're able to make value deductions like "I don't have the right to impose this on anybody else", then you're not a nihilist. It's a contradiction. If you think your own existence is pointless or insignificant, but you see the potential that others have, that's not nihilism--that's just being realistic. But of course, even as a "personal nihilist", you should still do your part in trying to make the world a better place. Otherwise, you're just kind of a parasite.
Well said.But...Hypothetically, what would "doing your part to try and make the world a better place" entail? If by "parasite" you mean someone who is actively trying to be unemployed* (or something along the lines of that), couldn't that person still theoretically make the world a better place by not having children and not supporting the meat and dairy industries?
I mean parasite in the sense that all we do is drain resources without really doing anything to give back. Parasites are just takers. All of us are parasites in this sense--but some are bigger parasites than others. For example, able-bodied fellows who refuse to work.Being an advocate for veganism/anti-natalism is part of what I'd consider an attempt to making the world a better place, yes. And there's numerous other things you can do as well, but it's mostly just about helping others in any way you can. Acknowledge that everything you do is the result of another human being's suffering (to your house, to your job, down the clothes you wear). Account for it, and take whatever action you feel is necessary to counteract it. We're not going to succeed in preventing all the suffering in the world, but we can certainly try our hardest.